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A GOOD POLICY DECISION NEEDS 
GOOD INFORMATION
The ‘litmus test’ is a cost-benefit analysis
– basic expectation
• the EC requires assessments of the effects of all 
proposed regulations (COM(2005)518)
The policy process should surface all relevant 
information to inform a CBA
– the relevant issues
– the relevant data
The process should be transparent 
– enables the merits of the policy and accountability of the 
decision-makers to be easily evaluated
HAS THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
LED TO A SOUND DECISION?
Comparison of two processes
– Commission Inquiry in 2003
• detailed cost-benefit analysis informed the process
• but returns evaluated in light of factors unable to be adequately 
modelled
• small returns + large uncertainties = value of deferring 
regulation
– Politically-led process 2006
• detailed cost-benefit analysis was not undertaken
– “a new quantitative cost-benefit analysis has not been undertaken 
by the Ministry”
– “a number of important international trends have been observed 
since 2003”
» OECD says LLU is regulatory best practice
» evidence of increased competition leading to increased 
broadband uptake
• these deemed sufficient to proceed without further analysis
– the 2003 analysis considered irrelevant
HISTORY I
Telecommunications Review 2000
Telecommunications Act 2001
– Telecommunications Commission established within 
Commerce Commission
‘Section 64’ Review into Local Loop Unbundling 
2003
– Commenced April, 2003 (Issues Paper)
– Draft determination September 2003
– Amended draft determination October 2003
– Conference on amended draft report November 2003
– Final report December 2003
• Commissioner recommends against full unbundling (but 
requiring limited bitstream provision (a less radical option)
• Minister accepts Commissioner’s recommendation May 2004
HISTORY II
November 2005:  Speech from the Throne 
– “with respect to ICT, my government will be advancing 
policies to ensure that the telecommunications sector 
becomes more competitive and that we achieve faster 
broadband uptake in line with our competitors”
December 2005: MED-led ‘Stocktake’ commences
– primary focus on “the broadband market and our broadband 
performance as a factor in economic performance”
Feb 2 2006: Commissioner notifies Minister of 
Telecom’s broadband monitoring against targets
– more connections sold than required (116%)
– but fewer than expected sold by new entrants (24.5% not 
33.3%)
HISTORY III
Feb 14 2006:  PM to Opening of Parliament
– “we want to work with other parties on solutions which not 
only enable New Zealand to catch up with the rest of the 
world, but also enable us to keep up as these technologies 
develop further”
May 3 2006: ‘Stocktake’ findings made public
– recommends 
• full unbundling, sub-loop unbundling, backhaul and co-location
• accounting separation of Telecom
September 2006: Finance and Expenditure Select 
Committee process
November 6 2006: Select Committee review will 
report back to Parliament
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION’S PROCESS
1. Discussion document produced
– opportunity for all interested parties to make submissions
2. Draft report produced
– including full public disclosure of all written submissions
3. Revision of draft report produced
– full disclosure of all relevant material (including cost-benefit modeling 
undertaken by the Commission’s contracted advisers) enabled the 
identification of critical errors 
4. Conference held
– interested parties respond; subject the draft report and submissions 
by other parties that have influenced the report, to critical analysis
– cross-examination of interested parties by Commission and advisers
5. Final report produced
– critiqued by Minister and Ministries
6. Legislation introduced
– recourse to the usual legislative processes
THE POLITICAL PROCESS I
1. Intent of government to intervene announced
– ‘cause’ identified (competition ‘problems’)
– ‘performance metric’ identified (broadband uptake)
– “advancing policies” a strong signal that unbundling 
(previously rejected - contentiously) is on the agenda
2. MED-led ‘Stocktake’ review commissioned
– participation largely determined by the review team 
• a  ‘consultation’ process?
– “a range of inputs were received” (industry participants)
– “a series of meetings were held with stakeholders at ministerial 
and official levels”
• expert advice
– “Professor Martin Cave provided peer review on relevant 
elements” (not identified explicitly)
– “Dr Rick Boven (of Stakeholder Strategies) also provided 
consultancy input and other consultancies provided technical 
input
– Commission’s 2003 reports not included in references
THE POLITICAL PROCESS II
3. Legislative changes announced
– release of key supporting documentation (Cabinet minute, 
background paper) subject of controversy 
• subsequently added to press release page (date uncertain)
– other documents (some consultant’s reports, some papers 
prepared by the Ministry, stakeholders’ written submissions) not 
released publicly until late June
• including some with publication dates cited as being later than 3 
May (e.g. “Promoting Competition in the Markets for Broadband 
Services”; “The Cellular Market and Wireless Broadband Issues”
dated 28 June)
– other relevant documents identified as critical to the decision 
(e.g. minutes of MFAT officials meeting with OECD officials) 
released only after individual OIA requests
– an empirical assessment of the costs and benefits of the 
changes deemed unnecessary 
• Regulatory Impact Statement
THE POLITICAL PROCESS III
4. Select Committee submissions closed 11 August
5. Select Committee hearings September
– very limited opportunities to debate key issues
– members did not have the benefit of their advisers cross-
examining presenters
6. The final decision is not subject to any further 
testing
Has this process elicited robust, contestable debate 
that ensures all relevant issues are ‘on the table’?
THE KEY ISSUES IN 2003 I
Access to and uptake of broadband is the key objective
– NZ’s residential broadband uptake low by OECD standards
• despite very high internet access, use
• despite wide availability, low prices, multiple access technologies 
– many possible explanations 
• GDP per capita, population densities, urbanisation, substitute leisure 
applications, price of substitute internet access (‘free’ dial-up)
– uptake is not necessarily a good proxy for estimating potential 
economic growth 
• complex interrelationships with skills, applications, industry types etc. 
Competition has a role in driving broadband uptake
– but it is far from clear that unbundling per se delivers the best 
competitive outcome for driving broadband uptake
• theoretically and empirically, inter-platform competition is most 
influential
• there is no statistically robust evidence correlating unbundling with 
higher broadband penetration, when all the other factors determining 
uptake have been taken into account (although the empirical 
literature at the time was sparse)
THE KEY ISSUES IN 2003 II
Unbundling policies distort the incentives for 
investment in infrastructures 
– demonstrated theoretically, but little empirical evidence at 
the time
– particularly important for risky new technologies (e.g. NGNs) 
– unbundling may divert investment away from inter-platform 
competition into intra-platform competition, with the net result 
that the effects of robust inter-platform competition are 
lessened
The risks associated with requiring unbundling in 
embryonic technology markets are substantial 
(long-term dynamic efficiency issues)
– potentially overwhelming small gains in the present from 
price reductions (static efficiency issues) and increased 
competition/product variation on current technologies (short 
term dynamic effects)
THE KEY ISSUES IN 2006
Largely unchanged
Access to and uptake of broadband; investment in 
infrastructure are the key foci of the ‘Stocktake’
– the subject of reports commissioned from consultants 
(Network Strategies, Azimuth)
– how LLU will affect uptake and investment crucial to 
policymaking 
The uncertainties identified in the Commission’s 2003 
process are still relevant
– where are these uncertainties identified in the Stocktake?
– where is the irrefutable evidence that they are no longer 
material?
• theoretical
• empirical
THE ‘STOCKTAKE’ ADVOCATES THAT
Regulatory intervention is necessary because
– NZ has a broadband uptake ‘problem’ that is caused by lack 
of competition in the telecommunications market
– lack of competition has led to lower investment and lower 
quality products in the NZ market that is depressing 
competition and thereby broadband uptake
Unbundling is the ‘appropriate’ intervention 
because
– it is international regulatory ‘best practice’
– it will lead to greater broadband uptake than other policies
– it will lead to greater investment in the broadband market 
than other policies
BUT THE ‘SUPPORTING EVIDENCE’ IS 
CONTRADICTORY, UNCONVINCING, 
AND AT TIMES MATERIALLY 
FACTUALLY INCORRECT
Analytic methodology questionable
– Network Strategies determination of a competition ‘problem’
achieved using highly unscientific methodology
• ordinal ranking rejects all of the empirically and theoretically
significant  determinants significant in cardinal analysis
– NZ investment data self-reported by selected participants
Recourse to the literature is selective
– fails to address (or even raise) the extent of the uncertainties
identified by the 2003 inquiry
– relies predominantly on reported comments of other regulators 
(EU) and policy agencies, and cites only academic literature 
contained in the reports of these agencies (rather than conducting 
its own literature review and analysis)
– contains no reference to NZ analyses
• and undertakes none itself
WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE?
HOW ROBUST IS IT?
HAS THE NZ PROCESS SURFACED IT?
HOW IS IT CRITIQUED/EVALUATED?
1. ‘INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
BEST PRACTICE’ - MED
“a growing consensus on international regulatory 
best practice for telecommunications regulation …
recognised and promoted by the OECD which 
encourages the regulation by its member states of 
wholesale access products, even where there is a 
significant alternative operator utilising 
technology other than .. ‘DSL’ … connections”
MED  ‘Promoting Competition’ para 4
‘INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY BEST 
PRACTICE’ - OECD
OECD, 2001:
– “the most fundamental policy available to OECD governments to boost 
broadband access is infrastructure competition”
– “the likely winners are those companies that own, manage and are responsible 
for their own infrastructures”
– “clearly, infrastructure competition is the best policy tool available, but the reality 
is that it takes time to roll out competitive platforms” – i.e. unbundling is a 
stepping stone to full infrastructure competition
– “one of the key ingredients why some countries are forging ahead is whether 
there is competition between different networks with different technologies”
OECD, 2003:
– “LLU is not a panacea.  LLU cannot address all issues involved in relation to 
local competition”
– “rebalanced prices are important for new entrants wanting to take advantage of 
unbundling” – without it  entrants “can be caught in a price squeeze and maybe 
unable to offer services at competitive prices”
– “care must be taken to distribute the planning risks equally to both sides”
THE SUPPOSED OECD ENDORSEMENT
“Unbundling has not only delivered on the promise of 
lower prices through competition in the retail market, 
but has resulted in new entrants providing 
increasingly higher speeds and bundled services 
including the provision of television programming on 
XDSL”OECD Communications Outlook, 2005 cited by Network Strategies
But where is the empirical evidence?
US, EU
Only 2 countries (US, NZ) have undertaken a detailed 
analysis post 2002
– both regulators recommended caution
US is now moving away from mandating unbundling 
nationally (FCC 2005-A)
– individuals states (e.g. California) reducing regulatory 
requirements
EU is undertaking a review of all 18 of its relevant 
markets
– is it sufficient now rely solely upon competition law in at least 
some telecommunications markets?
‘INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY BEST 
PRACTICE’ – ITU (Kelly, 2006)
Distancing telecommunications regulation as far as 
possible from political processes
– stability between regimes
• strong incentives for ongoing investment
– reduces the likelihood of telecommunications markets being 
exploited for inefficient wealth expropriation or partisan 
political gain
2.  COMPETITION AND BROADBAND 
UPTAKE – MED
“ A key reason for poor performance is the lack of 
effective competition in key market segments.  A 
common factor in the leading OECD countries is 
the competitiveness of the broadband markets”
Stocktake para 34
“The incumbent broadband provider in New Zealand 
still has a significant market share, which in 2005 
was approximately three quarters of the 
broadband market”
Stocktake para 34
INTER-MODAL VS INTRA-MODAL 
COMPETITION – MED
“In New Zealand with our limited cable modem footprint, intra-
platform DSL competition is likely to be even more 
important for increasing broadband take-up and 
utilisation of advanced broadband services”MED  ‘Promoting 
Competition’ para 4
“The European Regulators’ Group (ERG) states that 
competition is (mainly) driven by access regulation and is 
access-based (intra-modal) rather than inter-modal 
(facility-based/alternative infrastructures)” MED  ‘Promoting 
Competition’ para 4
“The ERG notes there is competition from cable operators in 
some countries, but that does not necessarily mean they 
are competing”“
MED  ‘Promoting Competition’ footnote 5
ERG (05) 23 Diagram 1a page 4 (2005)
NO STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT 
RELATIONSHIP
y = 0.0095x + 9.4054
R2 = 0.0011
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BUT EVIDENCE THAT ‘TOO MUCH’
ENTRY/COMPETITION MIGHT BE NEGATIVE
y = -0.0048x2 + 0.4746x + 0.1055
R2 = 0.302
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ERG (05) 23 Diagram 1b page 4 (2005)
THE RELATIONSHIP IS NEGATIVE, BUT 
NOT STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
y = -0.0238x + 8.1417
R2 = 0.01
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TOO MUCH DSL COMPETITION MAY 
BE NEGATIVE FOR DSL UPTAKE
y = -0.0032x2 + 0.2724x + 3.3862
R2 = 0.2017
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INTER-PLATFORM COMPETITION MATTERS 
MOST - OECD (Sept 2005 Broadband data)
y = -113.2x2 + 84.012x + 2.295
R2 = 0.4657
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Non-DSL M arket Share  %
B
r
o
a
d
m
a
n
d
 
P
e
n
e
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
e
r
 
1
0
0
INCREASING NEW ENTRANT MARKET SHARE 
WILL HAVE ONLY A MARGINAL EFFECT ON NZ’S 
OECD RANKING (NETWORK STRATEGIES DATA)
y = 0.1632x + 7.6385
R2 = 0.2
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OECD OFFICIALS’ OPINIONS
“The OECD is in no doubt that LLUB has been a 
major factor in the recent acceleration of 
broadband uptake across the OECD … given this 
the onus probably falls upon advocates of the 
status quo to explain why New Zealand should 
not join the prevailing OECD orthodoxy on LLUB”
MFAT cable, para 18
– the policy bodies relied upon by MED (OECD, EU) have 
published no econometrically robust analyses that support 
the OECD hypothesis
• most published academic analyses reject it – see, Wallsten, 
2006 for a literature review)
– cannot discount that the rate of broadband diffusion is driven 
ultimately by factors other than the competitive nature of 
telephony access markets, and that current diffusion 
observations simply coincide with increases in the uptake of 
unbundling
• although unbundling may explain some small component of the 
marginal differences in diffusion rates in different markets, its 
effect is much smaller than other factors
WHAT THE LITERATURE SAYS
MED says:
“Distaso et al suggest tentatively that inter-modal 
competition more effectively creates competition, 
while noting that stimulating entry into the DSL 
segment of the market .. is less problematic than 
enticing entry into alternative platforms”
MED  ‘Promoting Competition’ para 4
Note: this paper is referred to in the ERG (EU) report, and is the solitary 
academic reference to the relationship between competition and 
broadband diffusion in the Stocktake papers
WHAT DISTASO/LUPI/MANENTI 
ACTUALLY SAYS I
Based on 14 EU countries, 2000-2004
– an oligopoly competition model with differentiated products
“the econometric evidence confirms … that while inter-platform 
competition drives broadband adoption, competition in the 
market for DSL services does not play a significant role”
– the principal, statistically significant finding of the study 
– not a ‘tentative’ finding, as claimed by MED
“the level of competition within each technological platform … is 
positive but insignificant … the coefficient is numerically much 
smaller than the one related to the inter-platform competition 
index, and very close to zero … although competition between 
DSL firms can potentially play an important role in promoting 
broadband diffusion, this effect seems to be completely 
overwhelmed by the negative ‘indirect’ effect of increased inter-
platform competition induced by promoting entry into the DSL 
segment of the market”
WHAT DISTASO/LUPI/MANENTI 
ACTUALLY SAYS II
“while stimulating entry into the DSL segment of the market 
through appropriate regulatory policies, such as local loop 
unbundling, is generally less problematic than enticing 
entry into alternative platforms … it is still very much 
unclear which is the most effective way to proceed in order 
to speed up broadband adoption”
“a general trend toward a more competitive DSL market” is 
evidenced, (intra-platform competition) but 
“in some countries, such as Denmark, Spain, Finland and 
France, the Herfindahl index for inter-platform competition 
has actually increased through time, suggesting a 
worsening of the competitive conditions between 
platforms”
– suggests competition on DSL is ‘crowding out’ investment in 
competing platforms???
“the price of narrow band internet access constrains the 
diffusion (through the price) of broadband access, 
suggesting that, at least to a certain extent, narrow band 
and broadband access services are in the same relevant 
market”
– ‘free’ local calling depresses broadband uptake
A FINDING SUPPORTED BY THEORETICAL 
AND OTHER EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Wallsten, 2006
– literature review – 38 items (12 empirical)
• GDP per capita, population density most important characteristics
• mixed evidence on efficacy of all policies used to stimulate uptake
• only one empirical study (Ford and Spiwak, 2004) finds LLU 
positive and significant (although a different model on the same
data (Aron and Burnstein, 2003) finds LLU uncorrelated)
– empirical study on OECD data
• methodology controls for differences in population density, GDP 
per capita, number of telephone lines per capita
• methodology distinguishes between different types of unbundling
• unbundling policies have ambiguous effects
– full llu not consistently correlated with broadband penetration
– sub-loop unbundling always negatively correlated
– regulated co-location prices (as opposed to mutual contract) 
negatively correlated
WALLSTEN’S KEY FINDING
“regulations that can reduce returns to investment 
(more extensive unbundling) or increase costs to 
entrants (allowing incumbents to insist on off-site 
location) reduce broadband investment.  In other 
words, market rules that keep costs low but allow 
firms to earn returns on investment are good for 
broadband growth”
– investment incentives for incumbents and entrants matter
– reinforces importance of overall institutional environment 
rather than specific regulatory policies 
• it cannot be discounted that regulatory environments supporting 
contractual negotiations over mandated pricing account for the 
EU’s observations of ‘more effective access regulations’ being 
correlated with broadband uptake
DENNI & GRUBER (2005)
Different model to D/L/M but very similar conclusions
– logistic model of technology diffusion
– US data 1999-2004
– results indifferent to specification of diffusion as per household, 
per capita or per fixed telecommunications line
“Intra-platform competition seems to have a positive impact only initially 
on the rate of diffusion, but then dissipates.  For the longer term, 
inter-platform competition has a much more important role in driving 
the rate of diffusion”
“In the US … there is now a trend towards greater emphasis of inter-
platform competition in broadband diffusion, in other countries such 
as the EU, unbundling is still considered as one of the cornerstones 
of driving broadband diffusion.  This may be also because of more 
limited scope for inter-platform competition, as in several EU 
countries, cable TV networks are not present or are not capable of 
delivering broadband services”
3. INVESTMENT INCENTIVES - MED
“OECD views and experience suggest that 
increased competition at the wholesale level 
leads to increased investment by incumbents, not 
less” Stocktake, para 11
– relies upon reports of MFAT officials’ meeting with OECD 
officials
– officials accept theoretical grounds for concern in regard to 
arguments for chilling of incumbent investment incentives
– cite as evidence ongoing investment in Germany despite a 
moratorium (‘regulatory holiday’) being denied with respect 
to Next Generation Network investments
– “if there is one area where we think the OECD’s thinking 
needs further testing, it is over the investment incentives 
associated with regulated network access.  We felt the 
ICCP’s attitude was somewhat cavalier on this point”
MFAT cable para 19
EU INVESTMENT TRENDS 2001-2004
(London Economics, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006)
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES – EU 
(11th Annual Report)
According to the European Commission, available 
evidence suggests that the regulatory framework 
has delivered the expected results
– Broadband lines reached 53 million in 2005  (up from 20 
million in 2004)
– “European investment … in recent years has been as high 
as, if not higher than, those made in the US and Asia”
Is the EU officials’ position justified?
ACTUAL INVESTMENT UNDER LLU 
- EU AND REST OF WORLD (Renda, 2006)
INVESTMENT – MED II
“More recently (i.e. post 2003), there is evidence 
that Telecom’s fixed telecommunications service 
infrastructure investment levels have been on a 
par with comparable OECD countries, in the face 
of increased regulatory pressure”
“In this period (post 2003), Telecom’s investment in 
replacing its residential telephone service 
exchanges has slipped by a year or more from its 
originally announced plan”
Has regulatory intervention already affected 
Telecom’s investment plans?
– e.g. prioritising investment in meeting bitstream obligations 
and enhanced DSL over investments in the NGN
– the role of uncertainty
INVESTMENT AND REGULATION IN THE EU
London Economics and PricewaterhouseCoopers 2006
Regression model predicting investment levels
Uses OECD ‘Regulatory Index’ as a measure of 
regulatory ‘quality’
“The regulatory index variable is positive but significant 
only at the 13% level” (collinearity of firms’ assets and regulatory 
index an issue)– p 50
“The magnitude of this effect may be low compared to 
other factors” (GDP, population, land area, country & company size)
– “countries’ GDP per capita has a positive impact on the levels of 
investment.  In particular, a 1% increase in GDP per capita would 
lead to a 0.7% increase in the level of investment.  The country’s 
area also has a positive and significant impact, but not density” p 49
• if investment increases drive broadband uptake, then higher GDP per 
capita drives broadband uptake via this mechanism
• supports contention that NZ’s small land area and small GDP per 
capita matter more w.r.t. broadband uptake than the regulatory 
environment
THE 2003 PROCESS
Has failed to surface all the relevant information to 
populate a detailed cost-benefit analysis
Has not identified the considerable level of doubt in 
academic analysis surrounding the accuracy of 
statements and policy positions advanced by 
regulators and policy agencies
The level of analysis and undertaken appears to fall 
far short of that required in other regimes
– e.g. no cost-benefit analysis, standards of transparency and 
accountability are less clear
Is it wise to proceed with the legislation as 
proposed?
– ‘reasonable doubt’ still exists
